ranger v. alamitos bay yacht club

Skip to Content (Press Enter)

Skip to Nav (Press Enter)

Effective, Experienced, Exceptional.

California appellate tracker, ranger v. alamitos bay yacht club (2023) 95 cal.app.5th 240.

As amended in 1984, the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act excepted from the definition of “employee” “individuals employed by a club, camp, recreational operation, restaurant, museum, or retail outlet,” whether for-profit or not-for-profit, so long as the individiuals are covered by a state worker’s compensation scheme.  This decision holds that general federal admiralty and maritime law follows this statutory lead.  So a club worker’s sole remedy is worker’s compensation under California’s workers comp law.  The worker cannot sue his employer for negligence or unseaworthiness under general admiralty law.

• UK & Ireland

How is this helpful for me?

• Claim the judgments where you have appeared by linking them directly to your profile and maintain a record of your body of work.
• Interact directly with CaseMine users looking for advocates in your area of specialization.
• Creating a unique profile web page containing interviews, posts, articles, as well as the cases you have appeared in, greatly enhances your digital presence on search engines such Google and Bing, resulting in increased client interest.
• The cases linked on your profile facilitate Casemine's artificial intelligence engine in recommending you to potential clients who might be interested in availing your services for similar matters.

  Know more  

• Browse cases
• Supreme Court of California

Ranger (Brian) v. Alamitos Bay Yacht Club

• ON OFF Text Highlighter

Report a problem

No. S282264

• Ranger (Brian) v. Alamitos Bay Yacht Club Supreme Court of California Feb 27, 2024
• Subsequent References
• CaseIQ (AI Recommendations)

B315302 Second Appellate District, Div. 8

Extension of time granted

On application of defendant and respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to April 2, 2024.

Edit Citation

• Distinguished
• Referencing
• Uncategorized

Get 1 point on providing a valid sentiment to this Citation.

Get 2 points on providing a valid reason for the above change.

Add Equivalent Citation

Get 1 point on adding a valid citation to this judgment.

Select Preference

Share the Judgment

Are you sure?

By clicking on this tab, you are expressly stating that you were one of the attorneys appearing in this matter. Before confirming, please ensure that you have thoroughly read and verified the judgment. In case of any confusion, feel free to reach out to us. Leave your message here.

Click here to remove this judgment from your profile.

The Alamitos Bay Yacht Club in Long Beach hired Brian Ranger as a maintenance worker . He helped the club with its fleet by painting, cleaning, maintaining, repairing, unloading, and mooring vessels.

One day, Ranger used a hoist to lower a club boat into navigable waters. He stepped from the dock onto its bow, fell, was hurt, and applied for workers’ compensation. Then he sued the club in state court on federal claims of negligence and unseaworthiness .

The trial court sustained the club’s final demurrer to the second amended complaint. The trial court ruled there was no admiralty jurisdiction .

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court decision in the published case of Ranger v. Alamitos Bay Yacht Club -B315302 (September 2023).

Congress enacted the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act of March 4, 1927 , which established a workers’ compensation program for “any person engaged in maritime employment.” The 1972 amendments extended the coverage of the Longshore Act but created uncertainty about the boundaries of that extension .

Congress later learned the 1972 law had created “a general confusion as to whether or not the Longshore Act applies.” The rules of coverage became a prolific generator of litigation. In 1984, Congress responded by introducing a degree of clarity: Congress sharpened the Longshore Act’s focus to exclude employees who, although they happened to work on or next to navigable waters, lacked a sufficient nexus to maritime navigation and commerce.

The 1984 statute thus carved out specific employee categories, placed them beyond the coverage of the Longshore Act , and assigned these employees to the “appropriate state compensation laws.” Among the carveouts were employees working for clubs .

Which clubs? All clubs. Initially there was disagreement between the Senate and the House of Representatives about whether the Longshore Act should exclude only employees working at nonprofit clubs. (H.R.Rep. No. 98-570, 1st Sess., p. 4 (1983) (H.R.Rep. 98-570).) The Senate wanted a broader approach but the House initially favored the narrower one. The Senate’s view prevailed: the exclusion applies to all club employees and is not limited to nonprofits.

Ranger concedes that his employer is a “club,” but then asserts that federal law preempts state law in this case .However the Court of Appeal noted that “national and state interests do not clash here. Federal and state law are in accord. For employees like Ranger, both Congress and the California legislature have replaced the fault-based regime of tort with the no-fault alternative of workers’ compensation. Both bodies have preferred the virtues of speedy, predictable, and efficient compensation for occupational accident victims like Ranger.” Ranger counters this analysis by repeatedly stressing the importance of “uniformity” of the general maritime law. In this quest, Ranger relies on Green v. Vermilion Corp . (5th Cir. 1998) 144 F.3d 332, 334–341.

The Court of Appeal responded “We respectfully but profoundly differ with Green. We therefore also part ways with Freeze v. Lost Isle Partners (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 45, 51-52 (Freeze), which relied on Green without adding to its analysis.”

Apart from Green and Freeze, Ranger cites cases predating 1984. However, “these authorities deal with old superseded law, not the new governing law.”

“ In sum, California’s workers’ compensation law is Ranger’s exclusive remedy . Congress in 1984 decreed this state law aptly covers his situation. A core part of the state workers’ compensation bargain is that injured workers get speedy and predictable relief irrespective of fault. In return, workers are barred from suing their employers in tort. The trial court correctly dismissed Ranger’s tort suit against his employer.”

BRIAN RANGER VS ALAMITOS BAY YACHT CLUB

Case summary, case details.

Pending - Other Pending

Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

Los Angeles County Superior Courts

Governor George Deukmejian Courthouse

Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding judges.

MARK C. KIM

JON R. TAKASUGI

Party Details

Appellant and plaintiff.

RANGER BRIAN

Defendant and Respondent

ALAMITOS BAY YACHT CLUB

Not Yet Classified

Attorney/law firm details, plaintiff attorney.

KRISSMAN JAROD ADAM

Defendant Attorney

FEDELI THOMAS M.

Court Documents

7/22/2021: Judgment - JUDGMENT [PROPOSED] JUDGMENT

7/22/2021: Notice - NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

10/5/2023: Memorandum of Costs on Appeal

11/16/2021: Appeal - Notice of Fees Due for Clerk's Transcript on Appeal: for Notice of Appeal, filed 9/15/21; B315302

9/28/2021: Appeal - Ntc Designating Record of Appeal APP-003/010/103

7/16/2021: Other - : Order Sustaining Demurrer Without Leave to Amend (incorrectly worded as "Tentative Ruling & Final Order")

11/5/2020: Amended Complaint: (3rd)

11/5/2020: Amended Complaint: (2nd)

11/1/2019: Response

11/1/2019: Declaration : Declaration of Thomas M. Fedeli ISO Defendant's Reply to Demurrer Opposition w-POS

11/1/2019: Declaration

11/1/2019: Reply : Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Demurrer w-POS

11/1/2019: Reply

11/1/2019: Objection : Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Objection to Request for Judicial Notice w-POS

9/21/2021: Appeal - Ntc Designating Record of Appeal APP-003/010/103

Docket Entries

Docket Updated -- Judgment amended on 11/07/2023 ; Costs: 931.89 ; Status Date changed from 07/22/2021 to 11/07/2023 ; Status changed from Entered to Amended

Docket Non-Appearance Case Review scheduled for 11/08/2023 at 08:30 AM in Governor George Deukmejian Courthouse at Department S27 Not Held - Taken Off Calendar by Court on 11/07/2023

Docket Updated -- Defendants Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Demurrer: Name Extension: blank ; Exact Name: Defendants Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Demurrer

Docket Non-Appearance Case Review scheduled for 11/08/2023 at 08:30 AM in Governor George Deukmejian Courthouse at Department S27

Docket Memorandum of Costs on Appeal; Filed by: Alamitos Bay Yacht Club (Respondent); As to: Brian Ranger (Appellant)

Docket Appeal Record Delivered; Issued by: Clerk

Docket Appeal - Original Clerk's Transcript 2 Volumes Certified; for Notice of Appeal, filed 9/15/21; B315302; Filed by: Clerk

Docket Updated -- Appeal - Notice of Fees Due for Clerk's Transcript on Appeal for Notice of Appeal, filed 9/15/21; B315302: As To Parties: removed

Docket Appeal - Clerk's Transcript Fee Paid appellant paid $383.19; Filed by:

Docket Proof of Personal Service; Filed by: Brian Ranger (Plaintiff); As to: Alamitos Bay Yacht Club (Defendant); Service Date: 07/05/2019; Service Cost: 69.50; Service Cost Waived: No

Docket Final Status Conference scheduled for 12/14/2020 at 10:00 AM in Spring Street Courthouse at Department 3

Docket Case assigned to Hon. Jon R. Takasugi in Department 3 Spring Street Courthouse

Docket Non-Jury Trial scheduled for 12/28/2020 at 08:30 AM in Spring Street Courthouse at Department 3

Docket Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal scheduled for 06/27/2022 at 08:30 AM in Spring Street Courthouse at Department 3

Docket Complaint; Filed by: Brian Ranger (Plaintiff); As to: Alamitos Bay Yacht Club (Defendant)

Docket Civil Case Cover Sheet; Filed by: Brian Ranger (Plaintiff); As to: Alamitos Bay Yacht Club (Defendant)

Docket Summons on Complaint; Issued and Filed by: Brian Ranger (Plaintiff); As to: Alamitos Bay Yacht Club (Defendant)

Docket Notice of Case Assignment - Unlimited Civil Case; Filed by: Clerk

Tentative Rulings

Background Facts

Plaintiff, Brian Ranger filed this action against Defendant, Alamitos Bay Yacht Club for damages arising out of personal injuries sustained while Plaintiff was working for Defendant. Plaintiff filed his original complaint on 7/01/19. The original complaint alleged that Defendant owned, operated, etc., the vessel “Lathan B” in a dangerous manner; specifically, the vessel lacked a proper and safe deck, ramp, gangway, plank, or other safe means of access. Plaintiff, employed by Defendant, had just assisted a co-worker in lowering the Latham B into the water using a boom and hook, when he then tried to board the vessel from a dock directly onto an uneven, slippery, and sloped surface at the bow of the vessel without means of maintaining balance and stability. Plaintiff fell and sustained serious injuries.

Defendant and Plaintiff met and conferred in an attempt to avoid a demurrer to the original complaint. As a result of the meet and confer efforts, on 8/13/19, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. The FAC provides additional details concerning the relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant, including the allegation that Defendant originally hired Plaintiff as a maintenance worker, but his duties later expanded to include maintaining and providing Defendant with assistance with its fleet of vessels, including the Latham B; Plaintiff performed painting, outboard engine oil changes, hoisting vessels in and out of the water, mooring, unloading moored vessels, cleaning vessels, maintenance and repair work and securing onboard vessel equipment. Plaintiff alleges many of these duties required Plaintiff to be on a vessel in navigable waters.

Plaintiff also added allegations about the incident that caused his injury. Specifically, he added allegations that the fall occurred “on the deck of the ‘Latham B.’”

10/20/20 Demurrer to FAC

On 10/20/20, the Court heard Defendant’s demurrer to the FAC. The Court provided the parties with a detailed and lengthy tentative ruling, which will not be repeated at this time, but which is incorporated into this ruling by reference. The Court, in its tentative ruling, indicated an intention to find the case did not arise out of navigation or maritime commerce, and to sustain Defendant’s demurrer on that ground. The Court asked Plaintiff to be prepared to address maritime activity at the oral argument on the demurrer. The Court also indicated it was not inclined to find the FAC did not allege Plaintiff was a seaman, and asked Plaintiff to be prepared to address that issue at the oral argument on the demurrer. The Court indicated that it would sustain the demurrer without leave to amend on each of the foregoing grounds, as the grounds were purely legal in nature, unless Plaintiff articulated, at the hearing, an argument convincing the Court otherwise. Finally, the Court indicated that, if it was satisfied with Plaintiff’s argument on the maritime jurisdiction and seaman arguments, the Court would sustain the demurrer with leave to amend on the ground that the FAC was a sham pleading, as it contradicted Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim and his original complaint.

At the oral argument on the demurrer, Defendant conceded the issue of the sham pleading doctrine and agreed the issue was factual in nature and not capable of being determined at the pleading stage. The parties argued about maritime jurisdiction and Plaintiff’s status as a seaman, and the Court ultimately took the demurrer under submission.

Later the same day, the Court issued a ruling on the submitted matter. The Court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend, and did not provide additional analysis concerning whether the demurrer was sustained per the tentative, on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, on the grounds of failure to allege seaman status, and/or on the grounds of the sham pleading doctrine.

6/10/21 Hearing

On 6/10/21, the Court heard Defendant’s demurrer to the SAC. The Court indicated it intended to rule on the demurrer on its merits, and wished to entertain briefing from Plaintiff on the substantive issues presented by way of the demurrer. The Court therefore continued the hearing on the demurrer to 7/15/21.

Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint

• Second Amended Complaint

On 11/05/20, Plaintiff filed his operative Second Amended Complaint. The SAC is primarily designed to clarify the discrepancy between the workers’ compensation claim and original complaint, on the one hand, and the First Amended Complaint, on the other hand. The SAC does not contain new or different allegations relating to jurisdiction.

• Parties’ Positions

Defendant demurs to the SAC, contending it does not plead facts sufficient to establish federal admiralty jurisdiction. It contends Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to exclusive workers’ compensation jurisdiction. Finally, it contends Plaintiff cannot state a claim for unseaworthiness because his duties did not expose him to the perils of the sea.

Plaintiff opposes the demurrer. He contends the issue of whether federal jurisdiction is properly invoked is not a proper issue for demurrer. He contends, to the extent the issue can be invoked, he has pled a claim for unseaworthiness that invokes federal admiralty jurisdiction, and the inquiry ends there.

Defendant, in reply, contends admiralty jurisdiction is not invoked under the circumstances. Defendant also reiterates its points, from its moving papers, concerning workers’ compensation exclusivity and failure to state a claim for unseaworthiness.

• Issue Ripe for Demurrer

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff argues, in opposition to the demurrer, that the issue presented is not ripe for determination on demurrer, and must be decided on summary judgment or trial. Plaintiff relies on Jerome B. Grubard, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. (1995) 513 U.S. 527 (erroneously cited as 526 in the opposition papers) to support his position. In Grubard, the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction can be established, at the pleading stage, by means of a nonfrivolous assertion of jurisdictional elements. Nothing in Grubard suggests that trial courts should not use the ordinary standard on demurrer when determining jurisdiction; if the allegations, objectively and on their face, do not support imposition of jurisdiction, then the case is subject to demurrer.

• Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction

The parties agree that the threshold issue is whether federal admiralty jurisdiction is implicated under the facts of the case. If it is not, then Plaintiff’s claim is governed entirely by the workers’ compensation system, and does not survive in state court. The parties also agree that there is a two-step test to determine whether or not federal admiralty jurisdiction is implicated. First, the party invoking jurisdiction must satisfy a locality test. Second, the party invoking jurisdiction must describe a tort that bears a nexus to traditional maritime activity. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc., supra.

The parties also agree that Plaintiff herein has passed the first test, which is the locality test. To pass this test, a party must merely allege that the tort occurred on navigable waters or, if suffered on land, was caused by a vessel in navigable waters. Plaintiff alleges he was injured while aboard Defendant’s vessel while it was in navigable waters.

The parties disagree, however, concerning whether Plaintiff’s fall bears a significant connection to traditional maritime activity. In order to satisfy this test, the plaintiff must show the general features of the type of incident involved have a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce. Notably, the Court does not look at the specific facts of the case to make the determination, but rather determines whether the tort is in a “class of incidents” that pose more than a fanciful risk to commercial shipping. Grubart, supra, at 539.

Plaintiff relies on Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson (1982) 457 U.S. 668, Sisson v. Ruby (1990) 497 U.S. 358, and White v. United States of America (1995) 53 F.3d 43 to support his contention that his fall is part of a class of incidents that pose more than a fanciful risk to commercial shipping. In Foremost, two pleasure boats collided, and the Court determined the collision was of the type that posed more than a fanciful risk to maritime commerce because a collision (if it occurred in certain locations) between two boats could potentially block maritime traffic, which would block commerce.

In Sisson, a pleasure yacht moored in a marina caught on fire and caused damage to other boats and the marina itself. Despite the fact that none of the vessels was commercial in nature, the Supreme Court determined a fire is the type of incident that could disrupt commercial activity because a fire on a dock could potentially spread to a commercial boat.

In White, which Plaintiff relies upon heavily, the plaintiff was a security guard retained by a ship repairer. She lost her balance when she stepped on a platform at the end of the gangway on a U.S. Navy vessel. The District Court dismissed the case, but the Court of Appeals reversed. In determining the incident had the potential to disrupt maritime commerce, the Court held the following:

The first issue we confront is whether the incident giving rise to this appeal has the potential to disrupt maritime commerce. Grubart, 513 U.S. at ––––, 115 S.Ct. at 1050. In characterizing the facts of this case, we must, like the Supreme Court in Grubart, describe the incident at an intermediate level of generality. Id. at ––––, 115 S.Ct. at 1051. Thus, we look to the general features of White's mishap and inquire whether it falls “within a class of incidents that pose[ ] more than a fanciful risk to commercial shipping.” Id. The facts reflect that the Kaiser, a public vessel of the United States, was docked alongside a pier at the naval base in Norfolk, Virginia, while undergoing repairs pursuant to a contract between the United States Navy and MHI. White, a security guard, disembarked the vessel and upon stepping onto a small wooden platform at the end of the gangway, lost her balance and collided with equipment stored near a building on the pier.

The general features of this incident may be described as injury to a person disembarking from a vessel in navigable water. Viewed in this light, it is apparent that an inability safely to avail oneself of the gangway and its appurtenances would greatly inhibit a variety of activities essential to commercial shipping, more specifically loading, resupply, and the coming and going of crew and contractors. Although these particular facts involved a guard contracted to secure the vessel during repairs, we believe that an unsafe means of egress poses a more than fanciful risk to a variety of activities essential to maritime commerce.

The Court finds White is not on point to the instant case. Plaintiff’s injury was sustained on the deck of a boat docked at a private yacht club, and the boat was not used for commerce. Plaintiff therefore did not allege an injury of the type that could disrupt commerce.

The Court is satisfied with Defendant’s showing that this slip and fall case does not pose more than a fanciful risk to maritime commerce. The cases cited by Plaintiff show nothing to the contrary. The demurrer is therefore sustained. Because this is a purely legal issue, and because this is Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, leave to amend is denied.

The Court declines to rule on the remaining issues posed by the parties in their papers, as doing so is not necessary to a resolution of the merits of the demurrer.

Defendant is ordered to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at [email protected] indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.

Defendant and Plaintiff met and conferred in an attempt to avoid a demurrer to the original complaint. As a result of the meet and confer efforts, on 8/13/19, Plaintiff filed his operative First Amended Complaint. The FAC provides additional details concerning the relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant, including the allegation that Defendant originally hired Plaintiff as a maintenance worker, but his duties later expanded to include maintaining and providing Defendant with assistance with its fleet of vessels, including the Latham B; Plaintiff performed painting, outboard engine oil changes, hoisting vessels in and out of the water, mooring, unloading moored vessels, cleaning vessels, maintenance and repair work and securing onboard vessel equipment. Plaintiff alleges many of these duties required Plaintiff to be on a vessel in navigable waters.

Matter on Calendar Today

Defendant demurs to the complaint, contending it is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

• Standard on Demurrer

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party’s pleading. It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purpose of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true, however improbable they may be.

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. Blank v. Kirwan 39 Cal.3d 311 (1985). No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no “speaking demurrers”). A demurrer is brought under CCP ; 430.10 [grounds], ; 430.30 [as to any matter on its face or from which judicial notice may be taken], and ; 430.50(a) [can be taken to the entire complaint or any cause of action within]. Specifically, a demurrer may be brought per CCP ; 430.10(e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. Per CCP ;430.10(a) a demurrer may be brought where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. Furthermore, demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that the defendant cannot reasonably respond. CCP ; 430.10(f).

However, in construing the allegations, the court is to give effect to specific factual allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent general or conclusory allegations. Financial Corporation of America v. Wilburn, 189 Cal.App.3rd 764, 769 (1987). And, if the facts pled in the complaint are inconsistent with facts which are incorporated by reference from exhibits attached to the complaint, the facts in the incorporated exhibits control. Further, irrespective of the name or label given to a cause of action by the plaintiff, a general demurrer must be overruled if the facts as pled in the body of the complaint state some valid claim for relief. Special demurrers are not allowed in limited jurisdiction courts. (CCP ; 92(c).)

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal.3d 335, 348 (1976). The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.)

Finally, CCP section 430.41 requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (CCP ; 430.41(a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (CCP ; 430.41(a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (CCP ; 430.41(a)(3).)

• Meet and Confer

The parties met and conferred prior to filing the demurrer and satisfied the meet and confer requirement. They were unable to resolve their differences.

Defendant demurs to the complaint, contending:

The Court can take judicial notice of the file and records from Plaintiff’s ongoing workers’ compensation action;

Plaintiff cannot establish admiralty jurisdiction;

The Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for Plaintiff’s injuries;

The fact that the incident occurred on or near navigable waters does not preclude application of the exclusivity provisions in the Act;

Plaintiff was not a seaman;

If the Court is otherwise inclined to overrule the demurrer, the Court should stay the action and permit the Workers’ Compensation Board to determine which entity has jurisdiction over the dispute.

Plaintiff opposes the demurrer. He argues:

The Court cannot take judicial notice of the truth of the matter asserted in the workers’ compensation file and documents;

Plaintiff’s complaint sounds in maritime law, which includes jurisdiction for failure to create safe vessel ingress and egress;

Plaintiff need not be a seaman for the purposes of the Jones Act in order to be entitled to the benefit of the federal seaworthiness doctrine;

The Court should not stay this action, as the workers’ compensation board and this Court have concurrent jurisdiction over the issues; any benefits paid through the workers’ compensation system can be used as an off-set to any judgment ultimately entered in this case.

• Issues to be Decided

The following issues must be decided in connection with this demurrer:

Can the Court grant judicial notice of Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation board files and records and, if so, what is the effect of that judicial notice?

Is Plaintiff’s FAC a “sham complaint”?

Has Plaintiff pled a claim governed by federal admiralty law?

Does Plaintiff need to allege he was a “seaman” to invoke federal admiralty law and, if so, did he so allege?

Should this action be stayed pending a workers’ compensation determination of which court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims?

• Judicial Notice

Defendant seeks judicial notice of the entirely of Plaintiff’s worker’s compensation board files and records. Plaintiff argues the Court should take judicial notice of the mere fact that these records exist, but not of the truth of the matter asserted therein. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the records and files exist and also of the fact that the records say what they say. Any record submitted by Plaintiff is judicially noticed not for the purpose of determining that the statements therein are true, but for the purpose of determining that Plaintiff made the statements. The Court finds these statements are not hearsay, as they are admissions by Plaintiff, which subjects them to the hearsay exception.

The most important portion of the documents is ¶2 of Exhibit B, Plaintiff’s application for adjudication of claim, wherein he states, “slip and fall on dock injured both knees, thoracic & lumbar spine, right shoulder, left ankle, and right wrist.”

• Sham Complaint

Defendant argues the FAC is a sham complaint. Defendant so argues because the FAC alleges Plaintiff was injured on the boat, whereas the workers’ compensation application and original complaint both alleged Plaintiff was injured on the dock. This is a difficult inquiry. The workers’ compensation application requires the statement of facts to be succinct (325 characters total), and Plaintiff merely indicated “slip and fall on dock.”

Plaintiff’s original complaint is not clear on exactly where the injury occurred. He pleads that, in order to lower the vessel, he had to board the vessel from a dock directly onto an uneven, slippery and sloped surface at the bow of the vessel; Plaintiff alleges he was injured while attempting to make the transfer. Thus, it is not clear from the original complaint whether the fall occurred on the dock or on the bow of the boat; it is only clear that he alleges he fell attempting to make this transition.

Plaintiff’s FAC clarifies and indicates Plaintiff was injured “on the deck of the ‘Latham B.’”

In Owens v. Kings Supermarket (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 379, 384, the court held that a demurrer was properly sustained where the plaintiff originally pled that his accident happened on a public street in front of the defendant’s business, but then the plaintiff, in response to a demurrer, changed his allegation to state that the accident took place on the defendant’s premises. The court noted the lack of explanation for the material change and found the amendment to be sham in nature.

At most, the Court here would require Plaintiff to amend his complaint to explain his workers’ compensation application. The Court would not be inclined to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend on the ground that Plaintiff’s complaint is a sham complaint.

• Federal Admiralty Law

The parties agree that a claim that falls under federal admiralty law is not precluded by the workers’ compensation exclusivity provisions. Thus, the most important inquiry on this demurrer is whether the complaint alleges a claim that arises pursuant to federal admiralty law.

There is a two-part test to determine whether admiralty jurisdiction applies to a tort claim:

“After Sisson, then, a party seeking to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ; 1333(1) over a tort claim must satisfy conditions both of location and of connection with maritime activity. A court applying the location test must determine whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water. 46 U.S.C. App. ; 740. The connection test raises two issues. A court, first, must ‘assess the general features of the type of incident involved,’ 497 U.S., at 363, to determine whether the incident has ‘a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce,’ id., at 364, n. 2. Second, a court must determine whether ‘the general character’ of the ‘activity giving rise to the incident’ shows a ‘substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.’ Jerome B. Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. (1995) 513 U.S. 527, 534.

“The logic of requiring commercial activity is evident. The purpose behind the grant of admiralty jurisdiction was the protection and the promotion of the maritime shipping industry through the development and application, by neutral federal courts, of a uniform and specialized body of federal law.” See Crosson v. Vance, 1973 AMC 1895, 484 F.2d 840 (4 Cir., 1973). The strong federal interest in fostering commercial maritime activity outweighed the interest of any state in providing a forum and applying its own law to regulate conduct within its borders. It follows that admiralty jurisdiction need and should extend only to those waters traversed or susceptible of being traversed by commercial craft. In the absence of commercial activity, present or potential, there is no ascertainable federal interest justifying the frustration of legitimate state interests. 1978 AMC 680, (1975) 528 F.2d 437

“We now turn to the second half of the Foremost test, under which the party seeking to invoke maritime jurisdiction must show a substantial relationship between the activity giving rise to the incident and traditional maritime activity. As a first step, we must define the relevant activity in this case. Our cases have made clear that the relevant ‘activity’ is defined not by the particular circumstances of the incident, but by the general conduct from which the incident arose.” Sisson v. Ruby (1990) 497 U.S. 358, 364.

Location of Incident

Pursuant to Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law (1971) 404 U.S. 202, 212, a dock is an extension of land, so an injury that occurs on a dock is not subject to federal admiralty jurisdiction. Plaintiff, however, cites various cases holding that admiralty jurisdiction CAN be applicable when there is an accident on a boat, even if the boat is moored or docked at the time of the accident. See, for example, Buckner v. State Boat Operators, Inc. (E.D. La. 1988) 680 F.Supp. 239. Defendant, in reply, focuses its argument on the “sham pleading doctrine” and the admission, in the workers’ compensation application, that Plaintiff was injured on the dock, and not on the boat itself. As noted above, the Court would, at most, sustain the demurrer with leave to amend based on the contradiction between the workers’ compensation application and the FAC.

Connection Test

Defendant argues the complaint also fails because it does not show a connection between Plaintiff’s activity and maritime commerce. Defendant cites various cases holding that federal admiralty law is only implicated if the tort produces a potential threat to maritime commerce, and that there must be an intimate relation with navigation and interstate and foreign commerce. Defendant argues Plaintiff was merely assisting in docking a pleasure yacht, such that this test is not met.

Plaintiff does not meaningfully discuss this requirement in his opposition to the demurrer. Plaintiff cites various cases holding that a vessel owner or dock owner can be held liable for defects relating to ingress and egress to and from a vessel. Plaintiff’s cited cases do not, however, discuss the requirement that there be a relationship between the act in which the plaintiff was engaged and interstate/foreign commerce; on the contrary, it appears clear that the plaintiff in each of the cites cases was working on a commercial boat of some sort. That said, Plaintiff does allege that Defendant owned the vessel in question; thus, to the extent the vessel was a pleasure yacht, it seems Defendant was renting it out to others for use. Would this rental of the vessel be included in the definition of “maritime commerce”?

The Court has read and considered Freeze v. Lost Isle Partners (2002) 96 Cal.App.4 th 45, cited by both parties, in connection with this issue. The Court therein held:

We further conclude that Freeze's general maritime claims against her employer are not barred by the exclusivity provision of California's Workers' Compensation Act (Lab. Code, ; 3601). (Green, supra, 144 F.3d at p. 339.) In Green, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the remedies available to a worker at a duck camp who performed duties similar to those performed by Freeze. Like Freeze, Green was injured while assisting another employee in mooring a vessel owned by Green's employer. In holding that Green was entitled to pursue both negligence and unseaworthiness claims against his employer despite an exclusive provision in a state workers' compensation act, the Fifth Circuit relied in part on the Supreme Court's decisions in John Baizley Iron Works v. Span (1930) 281 U.S. 222, 230-231 [50 S.Ct. 306, 307-308, 74 L.Ed. 819], and Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Associates (1983) 459 U.S. 297, 306 [103 S.Ct. 634, 641, 74 L.Ed.2d 465] (Perini). Those cases held that “the state workers' compensation statutes could only apply where the maritime tort involved matters of local concern which had remote or no relation to navigation or maritime commerce.” (Green, supra, 144 F.3d at p. 340, fn. omitted.) Here, Freeze's injury was neither remote nor unrelated to navigation or maritime commerce. Freeze was not “transiently or fortuitously” on navigable waters when she was injured. (Perini, supra, 459 U.S. at p. 324, fn. 34 [103 S.Ct. at p. 651].) It was not disputed that her operation of the barge was part of her employment duties, and not incidental thereto.

Emphasis added.

The Court is inclined to find that the instant case is unrelated to navigation or maritime commerce. It is a slip and fall action that occurred on a pleasure yacht that was attempting to dock at Defendant’s facility. The Court asks the parties to be prepared, at the hearing, to discuss whether or not a pleasure yacht owned by the person on whose dock the yacht is moored is involved in navigation or maritime commerce such that the purpose of the federal maritime protections is implicated.

• Status as a Seaman

Defendant also contends Plaintiff cannot sue under federal maritime law because Plaintiff was not a seaman. Defendant cites various cases from the 1920s in this regard. Defendant also cites Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai (1997) 520 U.S. 548, 554. The Court therein held:

Our recent cases explain the proper inquiry to determine seaman status. We need not restate that doctrinal development, see id., at 355–368, 115 S.Ct., at 2183–2190; Wilander, supra, at 341–354, 111 S.Ct., at 810–817, to resolve Papai's claim. It suffices to cite Chandris, which held, in pertinent part:

“[T]he essential requirements for seaman status are twofold. First, ... an employee's duties must contribut[e] to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission....

“Second, and most important for our purposes here, a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.” 515 U.S., at 368, 115 S.Ct., at 2190 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The seaman inquiry is a mixed question of law and fact, and it often will be inappropriate to take the question from the jury. Nevertheless, “summary judgment or a directed verdict is mandated where the facts and the law will reasonably support only one conclusion.” Wilander, supra, at 356, 111 S.Ct., at 818; see also Chandris, 515 U.S., at 368–369, 115 S.Ct., at 2189–2190.

Plaintiff relies on Freeze, supra, to support his contention that he need not be a seaman as defined by the Jones Act in order to be a seaman. Freeze does so hold. Freeze does not, however, abrogate the test detailed above. Plaintiff adequately shows that he alleged he performed tasks, including preparation of the vessel in various ways, that “contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.” Plaintiff fails to address the second aspect of the test above, or to show that he has alleged he has a “connection to a vessel in navigation or to an identifiable group of such vessels that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.”

Defendant notes that, in Harbor Tug, the Court held that a dockside worker whose duties mostly included maintenance, deckhand, and painting work did not qualify as a seaman. Plaintiff did not discuss or distinguish Harbor Tug in his opposition. It appears Harbor Tug is on point, as Plaintiff herein alleges he primarily worked on shore at Defendant’s facility. Plaintiff must be prepared to address and distinguish Harbor Tug at the time of the hearing if he wishes to survive demurrer.

• Stay of Action

If the Court determines, at argument, that the demurrer should otherwise be overruled, then the Court must also determine whether this action should be stayed pending a determination, from the workers’ compensation board, of whether or not to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s complaint. Defendant relies on Hollingsworth v. Superior Court (2019) 37 Cal.App.5 th 927, 929 to support this position. The Hollingsworth Court held:

“Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Legislature has vested the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) with exclusive jurisdiction over claims for workers' compensation benefits. (Cal. Const., art. XIV, ; 4, Lab. Code, ; 5300.)” (La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 27, 35, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 100, 884 P.2d 1048.) Thus, in an action involving a worker injured during his or her employment, “the superior court and the WCAB ... ‘do not have concurrent jurisdiction over the whole of the controversy, and one of them will be without jurisdiction to grant any relief whatsoever, depending upon whether or not the injuries were ... covered by the workmen's compensation laws.’ ” (Ibid.) “The only point of concurrent jurisdiction of the two tribunals is jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction; jurisdiction once determined is exclusive, not concurrent.” (Ibid.)

This case presents the question of which tribunal—the superior court or the WCAB—had jurisdiction to determine which tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has made clear that when a civil action and a workers' compensation proceeding are concurrently pending, “the tribunal first assuming jurisdiction” should determine exclusive jurisdiction. (Scott v. Industrial Acc. Commission (1956) 46 Cal.2d 76, 81, 293 P.2d 18 (Scott).) Here, the superior court exercised jurisdiction first, so the court had jurisdiction to decide which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction. The court erred by staying the civil case to allow the WCAB to decide that issue, and the WCAB erred by proceeding without deference to the superior court. We therefore grant plaintiffs' petition.

Plaintiff, in opposition, argues that the foregoing general rule does not apply in maritime cases. Plaintiff relies on various cases to support his position, the first of which is Hamilton v. County of Los Angeles (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 982, 997-998. Defendant correctly notes that the Hamilton Court was not asked to determine whether a workers’ compensation proceeding and a state court maritime proceeding can go forward concurrently. The Hamilton Court’s inquiry was into whether the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy was workers’ compensation; the Court held it was not. The Court did, however, conclude that (a) the defendant in the maritime litigation was entitled to an off-set of any amounts the plaintiff obtained in the workers’ compensation proceedings, and (b) “The rights and duties involved in the Jones Act remedy differ from those under the state compensation act both in their source under the Constitution of the United States [citation] and in their nature as developed by the federal cases. [Citation.] The issues determinative of jurisdiction under the Jones Act are thus far different from those determinative of jurisdiction under the state compensation law. It is not the same controversy once litigated which is being relitigated, and there is no merger of the cause of action in the compensation award. [Citations.]” ( Id., at p. 635.)”

The key takeaway from Hamilton is that the two cases, one in front of the workers’ compensation board and the other in state court, are “not the same controversy.” This is distinguishable from Hollingsworth, where the Court was concerned about both the board and the court simultaneously exercising jurisdiction over “the whole of the controversy.”

The Court finds Defendant failed to cite authority, in the specialized context of federal maritime law, holding that the case must be stayed pending the outcome of the workers’ compensation board proceedings. The fact that there is a body of authority concerning the right of the employer to an off-set under the circumstances suggests neither proceeding need be stayed, as the right to an off-set will sufficiently protect the employer from any double or duplicative recovery.

The Court is inclined to sustain the demurrer. Because the issues presented are purely legal in nature, the Court is inclined to deny leave to amend. The Court asks Counsel to be prepared to address the following issues at the time of the hearing:

Is a pleasure yacht sufficiently involved in maritime commerce to invoke federal maritime jurisdiction?

Has Plaintiff alleged he is a “seaman,” which is defined by the United States Supreme Court as a person who ““connection to a vessel in navigation or to an identifiable group of such vessels that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature”? What effect does Plaintiff’s primary responsibility as a dock-side worker have on his ability to sue under the authority of Harbor Tug?

If, at the conclusion of the hearing, the Court finds Plaintiff has answered the foregoing queries to the Court’s satisfaction, then the Court will sustain the demurrer with leave to amend on the ground that the FAC appears to be a sham pleading. Plaintiff will be required, by way of a Second Amended Complaint, to explain why his workers’ compensation application alleges he was injured “on the dock,” when his First Amended Complaint alleges he was injured on a vessel.

Counsel are asked to make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on the demurrer.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

After review of the court file, the Court makes the following order:

Department 3 of the Personal Injury Court has determined that the above entitled action is complicated based upon the number of pretrial hearings and/or the complexity of the issues presented.

AT THE DIRECTION OF DEPARTMENT 1:

This case is hereby transferred and reassigned to the following Independent Calendar Court in THE SOUTH DISTRICT, JUDGE KIM presiding in DEPT. S27 of the LONG BEACH Courthouse , for all purposes except trial . Department 1 hereby delegates to the Independent Calendar Court the authority to assign the cause for trial to that Independent Calendar Court.

The Order is signed and filed this date, and incorporated herein by reference. Any pending motions or hearings, including trial and status conferences, will be reset, continued or vacated at the direction of the newly assigned Independent Calendar court.

Upon receipt of this notice, counsel for Plaintiff shall give notice to all parties of record.

DATED: November 8, 2019 ___________________________

Hon. Jon Takasugi

Judge of the Superior Court

Search Court Records

Get Deeper Insights on Court Cases

Latest cases where Alamitos Bay Yacht Club is a litigant

California Supreme Court | Other | 2023-10-16

California Courts Of Appeal | Other | 2021-09-15

Latest cases where CCLS LLC is a litigant

Los Angeles County Superior Courts | Family | 2020-04-27

Los Angeles County Superior Courts | Other | 2019-10-01

Los Angeles County Superior Courts | Other | 2015-02-04

Latest cases represented by Lawyer FEDELI THOMAS M.

Los Angeles County Superior Courts | Contract | 2022-03-17

Los Angeles County Superior Courts | Personal Injury | 2022-02-28

Why is this public record being published online?

UniCourt uses cookies to improve your online experience, for more information please see our Privacy Policy . By continuing to use this website, you agree to UniCourt’s General Disclaimer , Terms of Service , Cancellation and Refund Policy , Privacy Policy , and Public Records Policy . If you do not agree with these terms, then do not use our website and/or services.