el toro sailboat mast

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• Sailboat Guide

EL Toro is a 7 ′ 10 ″ / 2.4 m monohull sailboat designed by Charles McGregor and built by Schock W.D. and Moore Sailboats starting in 1939.

Rig and Sails

Auxilary power, accomodations, calculations.

The theoretical maximum speed that a displacement hull can move efficiently through the water is determined by it's waterline length and displacement. It may be unable to reach this speed if the boat is underpowered or heavily loaded, though it may exceed this speed given enough power. Read more.

Classic hull speed formula:

Hull Speed = 1.34 x √LWL

Max Speed/Length ratio = 8.26 ÷ Displacement/Length ratio .311 Hull Speed = Max Speed/Length ratio x √LWL

Sail Area / Displacement Ratio

A measure of the power of the sails relative to the weight of the boat. The higher the number, the higher the performance, but the harder the boat will be to handle. This ratio is a "non-dimensional" value that facilitates comparisons between boats of different types and sizes. Read more.

SA/D = SA ÷ (D ÷ 64) 2/3

• SA : Sail area in square feet, derived by adding the mainsail area to 100% of the foretriangle area (the lateral area above the deck between the mast and the forestay).
• D : Displacement in pounds.

Ballast / Displacement Ratio

A measure of the stability of a boat's hull that suggests how well a monohull will stand up to its sails. The ballast displacement ratio indicates how much of the weight of a boat is placed for maximum stability against capsizing and is an indicator of stiffness and resistance to capsize.

Ballast / Displacement * 100

Displacement / Length Ratio

A measure of the weight of the boat relative to it's length at the waterline. The higher a boat’s D/L ratio, the more easily it will carry a load and the more comfortable its motion will be. The lower a boat's ratio is, the less power it takes to drive the boat to its nominal hull speed or beyond. Read more.

D/L = (D ÷ 2240) ÷ (0.01 x LWL)³

• D: Displacement of the boat in pounds.
• LWL: Waterline length in feet

Comfort Ratio

This ratio assess how quickly and abruptly a boat’s hull reacts to waves in a significant seaway, these being the elements of a boat’s motion most likely to cause seasickness. Read more.

Comfort ratio = D ÷ (.65 x (.7 LWL + .3 LOA) x Beam 1.33 )

• D: Displacement of the boat in pounds
• LOA: Length overall in feet
• Beam: Width of boat at the widest point in feet

Capsize Screening Formula

This formula attempts to indicate whether a given boat might be too wide and light to readily right itself after being overturned in extreme conditions. Read more.

CSV = Beam ÷ ³√(D / 64)

The El Toro is one of several variants of the original Charles MacGregor designed Sabot, which appeared in The Rudder Magazine in 1939. Others include the NAPLES SABOT, the US SABOT, and the HOLDFAST TRAINER of Australia. The EL TORO is primarily seen on the US west coast.

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Transporting a Mast

• Thread starter Phil V25
• Start date Jun 21, 2009
• Macgregor Owner Forums
• Ask A Macgregor Owner

I need to bring my mast home for some repair work. I don't want to bring the whole boat home, any suggestions for bring the just the mast. I have a long bed super cab F150 with a topper.  

Been my experience to tote the mast home aboard the same trailer that you haul your boat around on. Be careful though.Advantage over length is gained by rigging the mast at an upward angle toward the hitch/ladder end. Above all observe towing safety conventions. Tie a red rag on the rearward end. Tom  

I guess it would depend on how long your truck is... figure the mast is 28' long for that vessel. If it doesn't hang over too much in the front or rear (be sure to check vehicle regs regarding this) I guess you could fasten it to the top of the truck, and use a mast support in the bed to help secure it. Usually, I've trailered the entire boat - a hassle to be sure, but at least you know it should get there safely...maybe plan some other projects at the same time for the vessel so the trip isn't a total waste.  

imho, I would drag the boat on the trailer, and not try to jury rig a support, unless you have a very long trailer to hold the mast. the mast is just too long to carry over the truck. legally. and you'll probably break something. Trying to save an hour or two will seem foolish if you break the mast. -(my .02)  

I had to buy a new (used) mast when I was dismasted at the mooring by a drunken power boater in the middle of the night. I used the boat trailer to get the new mast home. I bolted a 2X4 cross member across the bunks at the back with a couple of short uprights spaced 3" apart near the center to hold the mast in place. Worked fine.  

MrBill_FLL said: imho, I would drag the boat on the trailer, and not try to jury rig a support, unless you have a very long trailer to hold the mast. the mast is just too long to carry over the truck. legally. and you'll probably break something. Trying to save an hour or two will seem foolish if you break the mast. -(my .02) Click to expand

Bill at BOATS 4 SAIL

I had a customer come up to my shop in Wisconsin, last week, from Texas, 1,004 miles, to get a new mast for a 26M which is 30' long, and heavier. He had a 2000 Ford F150, with the small seat(s) behind the drivers seat, no topper. He had made 3 crutches, out of 2x's, one in the back of the bed, one in the front of the bed, and one attached to his brush-guard in the front. - Bill at BOATS 4 SAIL  

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Kaliningrad: Impregnable Fortress or “Russian Alamo”?

The Baltic Sea port city of Kaliningrad, the seat of a sovereign exclave of the Russian Federation between Lithuania and Poland, in the Russian oblast (administrative region) bearing its name, has been a fortress since its founding as Konigsberg in 1255. The Soviet Union’s Red Army captured it from the Germans in April 1945 in one of the last combat operations in East Prussia. After the war, Konigsberg was renamed Kaliningrad in honor of the head of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Kalinin. As part of the August 1945 Potsdam Agreement, the city retained its fortress-like character as the leading edge of the USSR’s Baltic Military District and forward base of the Soviet Union’s Baltic Fleet from 1952 onward. The Soviet frigate Storozhevoy that mutinied and made a failed attempt to escape to Sweden in November 1975, and the Soviet S-363 submarine that famously grounded off the Swedish naval port of Karlskrona in 1981 in the “Whiskey on the Rocks” incident were both in the Baltic Fleet.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 left Kaliningrad as a Russian island in what increasingly became a NATO sea of new alliance members that included Poland and Lithuania, and a Baltic Sea that went from being a Cold War contested body of water to a NATO lake in just a decade. As a result of initial NATO encroachment in the 1990s and accelerating under the rule of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kaliningrad has regained its status as a fortress on the Baltic Sea, now armed with cruise missiles, surface-to-air-missile (SAM) batteries, the future submarines of the Baltic Fleet, and nuclear weapons. What then is Kaliningrad? A great Russian anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) fortress threatening safe transit of the Baltic Sea and the vulnerable Baltic States, or a lone outpost surrounded by adversaries—as was the Alamo in 1836, before the Texas revolutionaries within it were overrun?

  Kaliningrad’s Modern Ramparts

From the 1990s through early 2016, Kaliningrad’s military forces were relatively weak but got a significant boost by 2021 with heavy and diverse armaments—missiles, warships, armored vehicles, and troops. The latter consisted of the 11th Army Corps, whose composite ground force units had a nominal strength of 12,000 to 18,000 troops , including T-72 tanks, BTK armored personnel carriers, mobile rocket launchers, and artillery. In addition, the heavily mechanized 336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade resided in the Kaliningrad oblast, equipped with BTR armored personnel carriers, with at least one battalion capable of air assault. The aircraft in the oblast included four squadrons equipped with a mix of Su-30SM, Su-24, and Su-27 aircraft that were supported by a robust air and missile defense, including four battalions of the S-400 SAM system.

In 2022, the Baltic Fleet contained 52 surface warships, including four of the new, cruise missile-armed Steregushchiy-class corvettes, one Kilo-class submarine, and numerous support vessels. Two of the fleet’s Buyan-class corvettes mount the Kaliber land-attack cruise missile.

The land-based missile arming of Kaliningrad was extensive and included dozens of nuclear-capable Iskander (SS-26) ballistic missiles (with a range of over 300 miles ) and the antiship Bastion-P missile system, featuring Oniks P-800 missiles (with a range of 75–210 nautical miles). A map from a 2021 Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) report on the force posture of Russia’s Western Military District shows the depth of Russia’s militarization of the oblast.

Ukraine War Losses Don’t Affect the Baltics

As with other elements of the Russian armed forces, the Russia-Ukraine war has taken a toll on forces originally based in Kaliningrad, as Russia has mobilized units from other regions to offset losses sustained in its invasion. Some US sources have reported that the 11th Army Corps was moved to Ukraine in spring 2022 and suffered heavy losses in combat near the city of Kharkiv in August and September. One battalion of the 336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade has been reported as deployed to Ukraine as well.

Despite the loss of these ground forces, the air, naval, and missile armament of Kaliningrad remains mostly intact. In February 2023, Dutch F-35s intercepted Russian combat aircraft from Kaliningrad near Poland and escorted them out of Polish air space. In April 2023, German and UK Typhoon fighters intercepted Russian combat aircraft over the Baltic s . Russia’s Baltic Fleet also remains active with exercises late last year . Russia’s 2022 Maritime Doctrine suggests that the Russia will continue to press the boundaries of gray-zone warfare, which would certainly include the Baltic region. The Russian submarine force, arguably the most well-resourced and competent arm of the Russian Navy, remains unaffected by the Russia-Ukraine war, and while the Baltic Fleet now possesses one operational Kilo-class submarine, it could ultimately field upwards of six Lada-class advanced subs if their construction continues.

Kaliningrad in the Context of a Larger NATO in the Baltics

While its land-based component may be reduced significantly in numbers , Kaliningrad retains formidable armaments with which to threaten NATO resupply of the Baltic States—and now Finland—as alliance members. Until it develops a larger submarine force, much of the Russian threat resides within air and missile components of Kaliningrad’s armament. Research on that threat, in particular from the Yet Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) suggests that Russian ground-based radars and aircraft are essential to Russian surface-to-surface-missile command of the eastern Baltic region. Destruction of any of those parts of the Russian Federation’s Baltic reconnaissance strike complex could seriously reduce the range and effectiveness of Russian missile forces.

Despite this vulnerability to Russian missiles, NATO members Poland and Lithuania—whose territories separate Kaliningrad from Russian ally Belarus only by the 100-kilometer “Suwalki Gap”—remain vigilant against potential Russian aggression. Lithuania still refers to the Kaliningrad oblast as the “biggest threat in the region,” and Poland remains concerned about Russian artillery and missile attacks emanating from the Kaliningrad oblast against NATO nations. Poland recently moved a US-made HIMARS rocket battery near the Kaliningrad border, demonstrating continued concern for potential Russian aggression. Poland also continues to upgrade its ground forces with new mechanized units that could threaten Kaliningrad in return. NATO has long believed that Kaliningrad has been a deployment location for Russian nuclear weapons . Their continued presence further aggravates the security situation in the Baltic region.

Lynchpin or Liability?

Kaliningrad will remain of value to Russia as it is the only year-round, ice-free port of the Baltic Fleet. The weakened Russian ground-force presence in the oblast adds a degree of risk to any Russian operation in the region and reduces the local ground-based threat to Poland and Lithuania. While Russian troops might not threaten the "Suwalki Gap,” Russian aircraft, missiles, and warships based in the Kaliningrad oblast could still obstruct NATO resupply efforts. Kaliningrad, however well-armed, is still surrounded by NATO territory much as West Berlin was encircled by Soviet forces during the Cold War. Yet the specter of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in defense of Kaliningrad may impede any major Western efforts against Russia’s Kaliningrad oblast. No doubt, NATO will continue to watch Kaliningrad and devise methods to limit its impact on the wider Baltic region.

Steve Wills is a Research Scientist with CNA’s Strategy and Policy Analysis Program. . As a Navy historian, his research interests include the history of U.S. Navy strategy development over the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War eras, and the post-World War II Navy surface fleet.

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2024 Totally Dinghy Regatta

Richmond Yacht Club : October 5, 2024

RYC welcomes fall sailing by inviting you to enjoy a one-day regatta on the sunny and pleasant Richmond Riviera! The El Toros need five or more boats registered by Tuesday, October 1st to be sailed and scored as One Design. Snacks on the deck after sailing, along with an awards ceremony. Competitors Briefing and Check-in at 1000. Up to four races are scheduled. Entry fee: $30

                      Register at: https://www.regattanetwork.com/event/28371

77th El Toro Stampede

Richmond Yacht Club : October 13, 2024                                                                                  NOR

The 77th El Toro Stampede, the longest running regatta at Richmond Yacht Club, takes place October 13, 2024. There will be four fleet races. Open to Juniors and Seniors. Get your El Toro out of the rafters, dust it off, and come play on the Richmond Riviera.

                      Register at: https://www.regattanetwork.com/event/28740

                      For further information or to volunteer for this regatta, contact:

                       Vickie Gilmour  [email protected]

Read newly posted article from 1973 Class Handbook... Highlights in El Toro History

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North American El Toro Championships

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Kaliningrad: Russia’s ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ deep in Nato territory

Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

Disclosure statement

Stefan Wolff receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace. He is a past recipient of grants from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow of the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.

University of Birmingham provides funding as a founding partner of The Conversation UK.

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The Russian Baltic Fleet has announced that it carried out a series of simulated missile strikes of its nuclear-capable Iskander system. This is not the first time that the Russian exclave – roughly the size of Northern Ireland and wedged between Nato and EU members Poland and Lithuania – has made the headlines as part of Russia’s sabre-rattling.

The Iskander missile system was first introduced to the region in 2016 and then upgraded in 2018 , as part of a Russian strategy to counter Nato’s deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defence shield in Europe. There have also been regular military exercises involving Russia’s Baltic fleet, which is headquartered in Kaliningrad, including Zapad-21 in the autumn of 2021 and a series of war games since the invasion of Ukraine.

Kaliningrad is one of currently 46 oblasts (administrative regions) of Russia, but the only one that does not have a land border with another part of the country. The roots of the territory reach far back in history and are closely connected to the fate of East Prussia and its capital of Koenigsberg. Founded by the Teutonic Knights in 1255, it is often associated with German militarism. But it’s equally famous for the philosophers Immanuel Kant, who lived his entire live in Koenigsberg, and Hannah Arendt, who spent part of her childhood there.

Like most territories in this part of Europe, wars – and the peace settlements that ended them – shaped their ethnic composition and political boundaries. East Prussia became detached from Germany after the first world war, with the creation of the “free city” of Danzig and the establishment of the Polish corridor . It remained part of Germany, however, until the end of the second world war, when it was conquered by the Soviet Red Army in early 1945. Its partition between Poland and the Soviet Union was agreed at the Yalta conference and formalised at the final formal meeting of the big three (Russia, the US and Britain) at Postdam in 1945.

The “ city of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it ” (approximately one-third of East Prussia at the time) fell to Stalin. The Russian leader renamed it in 1946 in honour of Mikhail Kalinin , who had been chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet – the head of state of the Soviet Union – at the time of his death in 1946.

Once a highly inter-mixed area with a population of Germans, Poles, Lithunanians and Jews, it was ethnically cleansed of most of its German population by Stalin. This was followed by a systematic campaign of russification which sought to erase all traces of German heritage.

Post cold war

The region recovered from its Soviet legacy after the fall of communism, benefiting from the special economic status it was granted by the Russian government in 1996 and from improving links with the EU in the years afterwards.

In recent years, Kaliningrad has also seen its economic value grow as one of the nodes in the multimodal trade networks connecting Xi'an in central China through Central Asia and Russia to the European market along the New Eurasian Land Bridge corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative. At the same time, this has made the region more vulnerable in the context of the war in Ukraine and western sanctions imposed on Russia.

For Russia, however, Kaliningrad’s main significance is military as an “ unsinkable aircraft carrier ”. As a military base, the region adds significantly to Russia’s strategic depth and is a critical asset for Moscow in its anti-access area denial (A2AD) capabilities in the Baltic Sea, potentially undermining Nato’s freedom of manoeuvre across the Baltic states and parts of Poland.

Moreover, if there was a further escalation of the war – potentially involving Russian moves against Estonia and Latvia with their relatively large ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking communities – Kaliningrad would be an important launchpad for Russian operations. So Russian military exercises in Kaliningrad are a signal of Russian capabilities and a way of exerting more pressure on the west – just as the EU was agreeing its sixth package of sanctions .

In light of Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, this signal should not only be read as one of defensive intent on Moscow’s part but also as a potential sign of things to come: the next missile launch from Kaliningrad may not be a simulation.

• World War II
• Russian history
• Kaliningrad
• Russia-Ukraine
• Ukraine invasion 2022
• Josef Stalin

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